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ERISA DOES NOT GIVE EMPLOYERS A
FREE PASS:  REFUSING TO PLACE THE
BURDEN OF CARELESS DRAFTING
ON THE EMPLOYEE*
Charles R. Peterson**
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 1963, the Studebaker Corporation shut down its facility in
South Bend, Indiana.1  Studebaker’s pension plan was under-funded, and work-
ers only received a fraction of their promised pension.2  Studebaker’s failure to
provide full pension benefits is widely viewed as the catalyst behind legislation
that eventually led to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).3  Since then, much commentary, debate, litigation, and legisla-
tion have surrounded the issues, purposes, and requirements of ERISA.
One such debated issue concerns conflicting terms in ERISA plan docu-
ments and Summary Plan Descriptions (SPDs).  While the federal circuits gen-
erally agree that the terms of an SPD govern over corresponding conflicting
terms contained in plan documents, circuits do not agree on whether a plaintiff
must also show reliance on the conflicting SPD language.4  Currently, the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
disagree on this issue, and no resolution is in sight.5
Specifically, courts disagree on whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover on
the terms of a defective SPD despite the fact he might not have relied on the
language he is now seeking to enforce.6  On the one hand, courts realize that
ERISA is supposed to protect employees and SPDs further that goal by inform-
ing employees.7  On the other hand, courts are wary of giving a windfall to
* Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 2007).
** J.D. Candidate, 2009, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas; B.A., Brigham Young University, 2005.
1 JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:  A
POLITICAL HISTORY 51 (2004).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Michael C. Joyce, Note, Setting a Standard to Rely on:  ERISA Benefit Claims Where the
Summary Plan Description and Plan Document Conflict, 90 IOWA L. REV. 765, 772 (2005).
5 See Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007).
6 Id.
7 Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The SPD is the document to which the lay
employee is likely to refer in obtaining information about the plan and in making decisions
affected by the terms of the plan.”).
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employees who never consult an SPD and then later try to assert rights under
that same SPD.8  While this issue first appeared more than twenty years ago,
soon after ERISA became law,9 the courts continue to disagree on the correct
outcome.  This Note focuses on how courts have addressed the split between
the circuits, the effects of this circuit-split on ERISA litigation, and the neces-
sity for a resolution to this problem.  This author recommends the Supreme
Court address this issue and find that recovery on the terms of a defective SPD
should not require a showing of reliance.  This resolution is the only one con-
sistent with the purposes and history of ERISA.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
as part of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.10  According to the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, “[t]he provisions of Title I of ERISA . . . were enacted to
address public concern that funds of private pension plans were being misman-
aged and abused.”11  The Department of Labor continues to explain that, “[t]he
goal of Title I of ERISA is to protect the interests of participants and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.  Among other things, ERISA requires
that sponsors of private employee benefit plans provide participants and benefi-
ciaries with adequate information regarding their plans.”12  The ERISA statute
itself repeats this essential purpose of protecting plan participants.13
The issues discussed in this Note arise when an employer14 or plan admin-
istrator drafts terms in an SPD that conflict with the terms set forth in the plan
documents.  Common situations giving rise to these types of suits involve plan
participants who have taken a break in employment or resigned.15
8 See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996).
9 See Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int’l Union, Local No. 5 Pension Fund,
732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984).
10 See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2006).
11 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, History of EBSA And ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/
history.html (last visited June 3, 2009).
12 Id.
13 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to
protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries
. . . .”).
14 Although for reasons of simplicity, the term “employer” is used throughout this Note, the
term is used to include plan administrators, insurers, etc.  Similarly, the term “employee” is
used to include persons entitled to benefits under an ERISA plan, including plan participants,
beneficiaries, etc.  The author acknowledges that not all employees are subject to an ERISA
benefit plan, but has chosen the term for its simplicity and readability.
15 See Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 2007); Aiken v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1993).  Amazingly, even terms as
important as the minimum service requirement necessary to obtain plan benefits often con-
flict in the SPD and plan documents and give rise to many of these conflicting SPD cases.
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III. THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BEHIND ENACTING ERISA IS BEST MET
WHEN COURTS DO NOT REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO SHOW RELIANCE
ON SPDS
While full plan terms are included in lengthy and detailed plan documents,
ERISA requires that SPDs:
shall be furnished to participants and beneficiaries. . . . . The [SPD] shall . . . be
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and
shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such partici-
pants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.16
The language of the statute itself refers to the “average plan participant,”
indicating Congress’ focus on the average employee and Congress’ concern
that an average employee might not be adequately apprised of their rights if
only given plan documents without a simplified explanation.  However, some-
times the terms included in an SPD conflict with the terms of the actual plan
itself.17  In these situations the question is:  which documents govern?  While
many SPDs provide that plan documents shall control, courts have almost
unanimously rejected this language and allowed SPDs to control.18  The ratio-
nale is that ERISA is supposed to protect employees and SPDs are supposed to
inform employees.19  Both of these purposes are thwarted when courts allow
employers to profit from their inaccurate SPDs as employees are left unin-
formed and subsequently unprotected.  Allowing employers to profit from inac-
curate SPDs creates the same policy concerns that lead courts to construe
ambiguous or conflicting terms in a contract against the drafter.20  Most impor-
tantly, employers can avoid all issues discussed herein through more vigilant
drafting and editing.  When an SPD accurately reflects the terms of the plan
itself, the issue of whether a plaintiff had to rely on the conflicting term never
arises and a lawsuit determining the parties’ rights is not needed since the
terms in both the plan documents and SPD are identical.21
Once a court decides the SPD will prevail, the next question in these
issues is whether the court will require the plan participant to show reliance on
or prejudice from the SPD, and if so, what level of reliance or prejudice must
16 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006).
17 Murphy Oil, 497 F.3d at 456 (“This effort at simplification, however, often produces
situations in which the terms of the SPD conflict with the more detailed terms of the plan.”).
18 Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy Is Not a Lot to Ask:  Decisions in the Second and Third
Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation over Conflicts Between ERISA Plan Documents and
Summaries, 6 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 367-68 (2005) (“[S]ince the passage of
ERISA, courts have come to agree that an SPD is an official ERISA-governed document that
will control when it conflicts with terms of the official Plan Document.”).
19 Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The SPD is the document to which the lay
employee is likely to refer in obtaining information about the plan and in making decisions
affected by the terms of the plan.”).
20 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Any burden of uncer-
tainty created by careless or inaccurate drafting of the summary must be placed on those who
do the drafting, . . . and not on the individual employee, who is powerless to affect the
drafting . . . . Accuracy is not a lot to ask.” (citing Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971,
982 (5th Cir. 1991))).
21 Valenza, supra note 18, at 393.
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be shown?22  The most recent court of appeals decision addressing the appro-
priate standard of reliance applied in cases of a conflicting SPD is Washington
v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.23  The issue of whether or not the plaintiff in a con-
flicting SPD case is required to prove reliance on or prejudice resulting from
the inaccurate SPD was central to the court’s holding in Murphy Oil.24  While
this Note will go into this case more in depth later in this section, footnote one
of the Murphy Oil opinion provides a clear description of the circuit-split on
the issue of inaccurate SPDs.  The Fifth Circuit noted that:
[T]here appears to be five-way circuit split regarding whether an ERISA claimant
needs to establish reliance and/or prejudice based on the conflicting terms on an SPD.
The Third and Sixth Circuits do not require a showing of reliance. . . . The Second
Circuit also does not require a showing of reliance, but does require a showing of a
likelihood of prejudice, which an employer may then rebut through evidence that the
deficient SPD was in effect a harmless error. . . . The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
require a showing of reliance. . . . The First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits require a
showing of reliance or prejudice, though it appears the terms “reliance” and
“prejudice” are sometimes treated synonymously. . . . Finally, the Eighth Circuit
requires a showing of reliance or prejudice, but only if the SPD is “faulty.”25
The confusion caused by these different standards and the ability (or
inability) to recover based solely on the jurisdiction where a plaintiff files suit
is contradictory to the stated purpose behind ERISA.  Some employees enjoy
more protection while others do not, solely because an employer does business
in one jurisdiction rather than another.26  The protection of employees under a
federal statute should not depend solely on jurisdiction in this manner.  There-
fore, this Note will evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of all five stan-
dards employed by the circuits, beginning with the earliest decisions.
First, this Note will discuss the “reliance or prejudice” standard introduced
by the First Circuit in 1984.27  Next, the discussion will focus on the “reliance”
standard described by the Eleventh Circuit in 1992.28  The discussion will then
turn to the “reliance, but only if SPD is faulty” standard set forth by the Eighth
Circuit in 1998.29  The fourth standard is the “rebuttable presumption of
prejudice,” which was introduced in 2003 by the Third Circuit.30  The last stan-
dard this Note will examine is the “no reliance” standard.  Although first intro-
duced in 1988, the “no reliance” standard has gained acceptance recently in
22 Murphy Oil, 497 F.3d at 458.
23 See generally id.
24 Id. at 455 (noting the break in employment was caused by an injury, not a decision that
could have been influenced or prejudiced by the SPD.).
25 Id. at 458 n.1.
26 Joyce, supra note 4, at 787-88.  Although Joyce frames this discussion as an argument
against a “no reliance” standard, he also illustrates the fact that, as with any circuit split,
recovery often depends on the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. See id.
27 Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int’l Union, Local No. 5 Pension Fund, 732
F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 1984).
28 Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992).
29 Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 146 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1998).
30 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).
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both the Third and the Fifth Circuits.31  One should note that with the passage
of time, the circuits have generally moved from the stricter standards of the
First and Eleventh Circuits to the more lenient standards of the Second and
Fifth Circuits.  The United States Supreme Court should follow this trend and
adopt the “no reliance” standard adopted most recently by the Fifth Circuit in
2007.
A. Govoni and the “Reliance or Prejudice” Standard
The earliest, and perhaps most frequently cited, circuit opinion on the
issue of reliance on an inaccurate SPD is Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons and
Plasterers International Union of America, Local No. 5 Pension Fund.32
Govoni created the rule that was later followed by the Fourth and Tenth Cir-
cuits.  Specifically, although an SPD may be inaccurate and misleading, in
order to recover under the terms of the SPD, a plaintiff must “show some sig-
nificant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing from, the faulty [SPD].”33
The First Circuit in Govoni, and its Fourth and Tenth Circuit counterparts, each
provide a unique insight into why these courts require plaintiffs to show either
reliance on or prejudice from an inaccurate SPD.34
In Govoni, the issue was whether a break in the plaintiff’s employment
disqualified him from receiving plan benefits.35  The court’s decision came
down to whether the employer’s failure to include the relevant provision
regarding breaks in employment in the SPD would allow the plaintiff to
recover.36  An important fact in Govoni is that the relevant provision took
effect after the plaintiff’s break in employment.37  In other words, the plan and
SPD could not have played a role in the plaintiff’s decision to take a break in
employment, because the conflict arose subsequent to the employee’s decision.
Unwilling to allow recovery without a showing of causation, the court ruled
that a showing of reliance or prejudice was required.38  The court analyzed
these issues separately, finding that in this case, the plaintiff had neither relied
on, nor was prejudiced by, the faulty SPD.39
In 1993, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Govoni rule in Aiken v. Policy
Management Systems Corp.40  In Aiken, the plaintiff resigned after sexual har-
31 See Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2007); Bur-
stein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found.,
334 F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).
32 Govoni, 732 F.2d 250.
33 Id. at 252.
34 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996); Aiken v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993).
35 Govoni, 732 F.2d at 250-51.
36 Id. at 252 (stating that although trustees violated ERISA § 102, the issue of whether
Govoni could “secure relief” depended on whether the court would accept case law sug-
gesting Govoni needed to prove that he relied on the defective SPD).
37 Id.
38 Id. (“[T]o secure relief, Govoni must show some significant reliance upon, or possible
prejudice flowing from, the faulty plan description.”).
39 Id.
40 Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993).
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assment allegations were made against him.41  The plaintiff, who was under
sixty years of age, argued that the SPD’s language motivated his decision to
resign.42  The relevant section of the SPD stated that “if a participant terminates
employment after completing 20 years of service but before attaining age 60,
the participant is entitled to distribution of the vested interest in the Plan.”43
The defendant argued that the SPD was not accurate, and the plan docu-
ments required a minimum age of sixty before plan participants would be enti-
tled to a lump sum distribution.44  The court, without much discussion, adopted
the Govoni “reliance or prejudice” rule.45  The Fourth Circuit reversed because
the district court had combined its discussion of reliance and prejudice
together.46  The Fourth Circuit explained that there should be two inquiries and
if the plaintiff could prove one or the other, he should be entitled to recover.47
Finally, in Chiles v. Ceridian Corp.,48 the Tenth Circuit provided its ratio-
nale for adopting the Govoni “reliance or prejudice” standard.  The issue in
Chiles was whether the employer was required to make health insurance pre-
mium payments for a group of employees under the terms of an inaccurate
SPD.49  In applying the Govoni rule, the court explained that applying “[a]ny
other rule would allow a windfall for some employees and unfairly increase
cost for employers and their insurers, who rely on the terms of the plan in
providing benefits and coverage.”50  The Tenth Circuit’s rationale illustrates
why the Govoni “reliance or prejudice” standard is wrong.  This standard,
instead of protecting employees, protects the employers and insurers who
drafted the plan documents and the inaccurate SPD by placing the burden of
proof on employees.
Although the Tenth Circuit is correct when it states that employers and
insurers rely on plan documents, it ignores the fact, recognized by Congress,
that employees rely on the SPD.51  Placing the burden on the employee to
prove reliance or prejudice is contrary to Congress’ stated intent to “protect . . .
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
ciaries. . . .”52  A court should be reluctant to reward plaintiffs with windfalls
simply because of a defendant’s honest error.  However, by requiring a show-
ing of reliance or prejudice, the court is also likely to deny recovery for many
employees who genuinely relied on or were genuinely prejudiced by the draft-
ing error, but cannot prove their reliance.  Additionally, as discussed in Part IV
of this Note, the Tenth Circuit’s fear of a windfall for undeserving employees is
41 Id. at 139.
42 Id. at 140-41.
43 Id. at 140.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 141 (“We believe that the district court was correct in its decision to apply
Govoni. . . . We adopt Govoni’s disjunctive construction as our own.”).
46 Id. at 142.
47 Id.
48 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996).
49 Id. at 1508-09.
50 Id. at 1519.
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006).
52 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
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not an inevitable outcome should a court reject the “reliance or prejudice”
standard.
Another problem with the Govoni standard is the confusion between reli-
ance and prejudice.  Many courts, such as the district court in Aiken, have
treated these two elements as if they were synonymous.53  This confusion pos-
sibly contributed to the creation of the next standard by the Eleventh Circuit.
B. Branch and the “Reliance” Standard
In 1992, the Eleventh Circuit adopted an alternative to the “reliance or
prejudice” standard described in Govoni, holding that in order to recover on the
terms of an inaccurate SPD, a plaintiff “must prove reliance on the sum-
mary.”54  This standard is stricter than the Govoni rule, as it does not allow a
plaintiff the option of proving the likelihood of prejudice flowing from the
SPD.  Instead, only a showing of reliance on the specific disputed terms of the
summary is sufficient under this standard.
Branch v. G. Bernd Co.55 involved an employee who resigned because of
the employer’s new drug testing policy.56  Before he left, however, he did not
complete the necessary forms for continued medical coverage under the Con-
solidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”).57  Two months
later, he was shot several times by an unknown gunman and was admitted to
the hospital in a semi-comatose condition.58  The dispute focused on the length
of time allowed for the employee to sign up for COBRA benefits after resigna-
tion.59  The district court held that that the plaintiff was not required to show
reliance on the terms of the SPD to recover.60  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
reasoning that by not reading the SPD, the plaintiff, and not the employer or the
court, thwarted Congress’ intent of having informed employees.61  Some con-
fusion exists as to whether this “reliance” standard really is a different standard,
or just a misinterpretation of Govoni.62  The reason for this confusion comes
from the Branch opinion, where the Eleventh Circuit cites Govoni and its reli-
53 Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007).
54 Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992).
55 Id. at 1574.
56 Id. at 1576.
57 Id. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2006).
58 Branch, 955 F.2d at 1576.
59 Id. at 1577-78.
60 Id. at 1578.
61 Id. at 1579 (“Congress . . . required employers to provide their employees with accurate
and understandable summary plan descriptions because it wanted ‘to protect the benefi-
ciaries of benefit plans by insuring that employees are fully and accurately apprised of their
rights under the plan.’ . . . [W]hen a beneficiary fails to read or rely on the summary,
whether it is accurate or not, the beneficiary . . . prevents full appraisal of the rights under the
plan.  Beneficiaries must do their part if Congress’ objective is to be met.” (citation
omitted)).
62 See, e.g., Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)
(classifying Branch as a separate standard); Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of
Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2003) (grouping
Branch with Govoni and Aiken).
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ance or prejudice standard, but then restates its own standard differently, omit-
ting any mention of prejudice.63
In Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc. v. Washington,64 the Seventh Cir-
cuit accepted the Eleventh Circuit’s “reliance” standard.65  Interestingly, the
Health Cost court cited Chiles and Aiken as origins of this rule even though
Chiles and Aiken articulated a “reliance or prejudice” standard.66  In Health
Cost, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident and received payment for medi-
cal bills from both the ERISA plan and her personal auto insurance.67  Accord-
ing to the plan documents, the plan was entitled to reimbursement if the plan
beneficiary received payments from a third party (such as an auto insurer).68
However, the plaintiff asserted the SPD could be interpreted to mean the plan
was only entitled to reimbursement if the plan beneficiary received payment
from the third party who had caused the injury, an interpretation which would
exclude payments made by the auto insurer.69
The issue the court addressed was whether the plan was entitled to pay-
ments made by the plan beneficiary’s auto insurer.70  The Seventh Circuit
stated that “[w]hen . . . the plan and the summary plan description conflict, the
former governs . . . unless the plan participant or beneficiary has reasonably
relied on the summary plan description to his detriment.”71  There is a glaring
omission in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion of any prejudice analysis.  While this
prejudice element was so important in the Govoni, Aiken, and Chiles opinions
that the courts gave the prejudice element its own separate consideration,72 the
Eleventh and Seventh Circuits either ignore it or treat it as synonymous with
reliance.
If the Govoni standard suffers from being too harsh on employees, then
this standard, despite the Eleventh Circuit’s assertion,73 blatantly disregards
Congress’ intent of placing the burden of protecting and informing employees
on employers and insurers.74  This standard, whether intentionally or inadver-
tently, eliminates the option for plaintiffs to prove prejudice.  Instead, it
63 Branch, 955 F.2d at 1578.  The court first states its interpretation of the rule from Govoni
as:  a plaintiff “must show reliance on the summary,” omitting any mention of prejudice.
See id.  However, in its string cite following that rule, the court cites the rule from Govoni
as:  a plaintiff “must show some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing
from, the faulty plan description.” Id.
64 Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 1999).
65 Id. at 711.
66 Id. (including Chiles and Aiken in a string cite following statement that plaintiff cannot
recover “unless the plan participant . . . has reasonably relied” with no mention of prejudice).
67 Id. at 706.
68 Id. at 711.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993).
73 Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e do not share the
Sixth Circuit’s belief that we would undermine Congress’ objectives by requiring benefi-
ciaries to prove reliance on inaccurate plan summaries.”).
74 Although it would be ideal if all employees read each provision of their respective SPDs,
Congress has not yet made reading an SPD a requirement to recovery under ERISA.  How-
ever, Congress has placed a burden on the employer to create an SPD that can be understood
by the average plan participant. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006).
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requires a showing of actual reliance on the specific contradictory terms of the
SPD to the plaintiff’s detriment.75  This standard provides very little protection
for employees and therefore does not further the intent of ERISA.
C. Marolt and the “Reliance But Only if SPD is Faulty” Standard
The standard set out by the Eighth Circuit best illustrates the confusion
among circuits regarding which standard to use and the available standards.
The Eighth Circuit held that if an SPD conforms to the formal ERISA require-
ments, the plaintiff need not show reliance to recover.76  However, if the SPD
does not conform to the formal requirements of ERISA, the plaintiff must show
reliance.77  While this standard potentially awards businesses for sloppy draft-
ing and would therefore be contrary to Congress’ intent, it nonetheless illus-
trates the conflict in this area of litigation between contractual and estoppel-like
interpretations of ERISA.
In the Eighth Circuit case, Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc.,78 an
employee sought retirement benefits.79  Under the SPD, the employee appeared
to have met the minimum service requirement, but under the plan documents,
she had not.80  The court found for the plaintiff, stating she did not need to
show reliance on the SPD because it was not “faulty.”81  However, the court
held that if the SPD had been faulty, the plaintiff would have been required to
show reliance or prejudice.82  The court stated, “to secure relief on the basis of
a faulty summary plan description, the claimant must show some significant
reliance on, or possible prejudice flowing from the summary.”83  While requir-
ing proof of reliance or prejudice when an SPD is faulty sounds identical to the
Govoni rule, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that an SPD that conflicts
with plan documents is necessarily faulty.84  The court instead defined a faulty
SPD as “one that fails to meet ‘the requirements of ERISA and its attendant
regulations.’”85  In other words, a plaintiff must show reliance only if the SPD
fails to meet the formal statutory requirements of an SPD, regardless of
whether the SPD conflicts with the actual plan documents.
On its face, Marolt looks like a misreading of Govoni; however, the
Eighth Circuit upheld the Marolt decision one year later in Palmisano v. Allina
Health Systems, Inc.86 Palmisano involved a terminated employee seeking
75 Health Cost, 187 F.3d at 711.
76 Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 146 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating plaintiff
was not required to show reliance and that an inaccurate SPD does not mean it is faulty).
77 Id. (“‘[T]o secure relief on the basis of a faulty summary plan description, the claimant
must show some significant reliance on, or possible prejudice flowing from the summary.’”
(quoting Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992))) (emphasis
added).
78 Marolt, 146 F.3d 617.
79 Id. at 618.
80 Id. at 619.
81 Id. at 621.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992)).
86 Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 1999).
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executive severance benefits.87  The plaintiff sought to take advantage of a
favorable passage in a booklet that he argued constituted a faulty SPD.88  The
plaintiff argued that the faulty SPD should govern and that he should not be
required to show reliance on the favorable passage.89  However, the Eighth
Circuit confirmed the rule from Marolt that if an SPD is valid, the plaintiff
need not show reliance, but if an SPD is faulty, a plaintiff must show reliance
or prejudice.90  The Eighth Circuit explained reliance was only required when
an SPD did not conform to the formal requirements of ERISA for two rea-
sons.91  First, the court explained that where the SPD is faulty, a plaintiff would
not be justified in believing it was an SPD and relying on it as such.92  Second,
the court stated that “[i]f a document is to be afforded the legal effects of an
SPD, such as conferring benefits when it is at variance with the plan itself, that
document should be sufficient to constitute an SPD for filing and qualification
purposes.”93
After explaining why faulty SPDs are not legally enforceable and there-
fore only protect employees when reliance or prejudice is shown, the Eighth
Circuit addressed the issue of contractual and estoppel-like approaches to
enforcing the terms of SPDs.94  On the one hand, the court borrowed from the
contract theory-like majority rule that the terms of an SPD govern when they
conflict with the terms of the plan documents.95  On the other hand, the court
also acknowledged this approach fails where an SPD is statutorily deficient
because a document that does not meet the formal requirements of an SPD,
unlike a contract, does not confer enforceable rights.96  In other words, where
an SPD creates enforceable rights, it is like a contract and no reliance is
required to enforce its terms.  However, where the SPD creates no enforceable
rights, a plaintiff would have to show reliance as if he were proving an estoppel
claim.
The Eighth Circuit is correct in taking the burden off an employee where
an employer has been sloppy in its drafting of an SPD, creating conflicts
between the SPD and the plan documents.  However, under the Eighth Circuit’s
standard, an employer benefits by drafting a document that does not meet the
formal requirements of ERISA.97  This standard works well in some cases,
such as Palmisano, where a plaintiff desires to recover under a document not
87 Id. at 884.
88 Id. at 887.
89 Id. at 888.
90 Id. at 887-88.
91 Id. at 888-89.
92 Id. at 888 (“The Plan book’s severance summary was hopelessly inadequate as an SPD
. . . . It contained only one piece of information required by ERISA, a mistaken description
. . . . The Plan Book directed Palmisano to an ‘enclosed description,’ a  document which he
never received . . . . The summary provided was so thoroughly lacking in the required detail
that it cannot be deemed even a faulty SPD.”)
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 While the previous quotation refers to non-SPD documents, it points out that SPDs can
“confer benefits.”  This language sounds similar to the contractual-like analysis used by the
courts to decide that SPDs control when in conflict with plan documents.
95 See id.; see also Valenza, supra note 18, at 361-62.
96 Palmisano, 190 F.3d at 888-89.
97 See id.
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intended to serve as an SPD.  However, one can imagine an SPD distributed to
employees and intended to serve as an SPD, but because of a formal deficiency
would not be enforceable under the Eighth Circuit’s rule.  In these situations,
the employee is punished with an increased burden of proof because the
employer, whether intentionally or not, failed to comply with a formal require-
ment.  Even where SPDs do meet all formal requirements, the Eighth Circuit’s
rule creates a counter-intuitive incentive for employers to argue that the dis-
puted SPD never met the statutory requirements in the first place.  Rewarding
an employer for creating a faulty SPD by increasing a plaintiff’s burden of
proof protects employers who failed to meet ERISA requirements.
D. Kodak and the “Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice” Standard
In Burke v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan,98 the Second Circuit stated it
was adopting a prejudice standard.99  The court moved away from the reliance
and prejudice standards set out by circuits before it, and developed a more
employee-friendly standard.100  The Second Circuit requires only a showing
that the plaintiff “was likely to have been harmed as a result of a deficient
SPD.”101
The issue in Burke was whether the plaintiff was entitled to survivor bene-
fits under her domestic partner’s benefits plan.102  The plaintiff argued that
because the SPD clearly required affidavits for most benefits, but not for survi-
vor income benefits, she was entitled to the survivor income benefits without
filing an affidavit.103  The defendant argued that the plan documents required
an affidavit to receive survivor income benefits.104  When choosing between
the different standards to adopt for resolution of this issue, the Second Circuit
rejected the idea that a plaintiff must show detrimental reliance.105  The court
stated that:
‘[a] rule requiring . . . detrimental reliance . . . imposes an insurmountable hardship
on many plaintiffs,’ especially on the estate of a deceased participant, and ‘[s]uch a
rule hardly advances the Congressional purpose of protecting the beneficiaries of
ERISA plans by insuring that employees are fully and accurately apprised of their
rights under the plan.’106
The court recognized that employees may learn of benefits from other
employees, the employer, a union, or other source and not from the SPD
itself.107  Because employees often learn of benefits from sources other than the
SPD, employees would be prejudiced and should be entitled to recovery even
98 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003).
99 Id. at 112-13.
100 See generally Valenza, supra note 18, at 392-93.
101 Burke, 336 F.3d at 113.
102 Id. at 105-06.
103 Id. at 106-07.
104 Id. at 107.
105 Id. at 112.
106 Id. (quoting Estate of Ritzer v. Nat’l Org. of Indus. Trade Unions Ins. Trust Fund Hosp.,
Med., Surgical Health Benefit, 822 F. Supp. 951, 955-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)) (alteration in
original).
107 Id. at 113.
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though they had never read the SPD.108  The court found that “[t]he result is a
presumption of prejudice in favor of the plan participant after an initial showing
that he was likely to have been harmed. . . . ‘[D]efendants could have rebutted
this presumption by showing, inter alia, that plaintiffs were aware of the Plan’s
[requirements].’”109
The Kodak court gets closer to Congress’ intent in protecting employees
by essentially presuming prejudice, and allowing the employer to rebut that
presumption.  While this standard is more beneficial to the employee, it still is
not protective enough.  In addition, the standard complicates litigation even
further by allowing rebuttal.  First, while this standard is not as strict as the
reliance standards, the Kodak standard still requires plaintiffs to prove some
level of prejudice.  While courts may not feel sympathetic towards plaintiffs
that cannot meet such a low level of proof, they should remember the follow-
ing:  one, the employer could have avoided the problem with minimal effort by
simply proof-reading and editing its SPD; two, employees usually have less
resources than employers or plan providers to engage in intensive litigation;
and three, Congress’ intent in enacting ERISA was primarily to protect employ-
ees.110  This standard will increase discovery costs and complicate litigation as
the employer is in the worst position to prove whether an employee was likely
prejudiced by a defective SPD.
E. Burstein and the “No Reliance” Standard
Four years after Govino, the Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to address
the issue of reliance on inaccurate SPDs in Edwards v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.111  In Edwards, the plaintiff was seeking disability
benefits after becoming totally disabled following surgical removal of a benign
brain tumor, but the defendant argued the plaintiff did not meet the minimum
service requirement.112  Under the SPD, he would have met the requirement,
but under the plan documents, he did not.113  The Sixth Circuit stated that
“existing precedent does not dictate that a claimant who has been misled by
summary descriptions must prove detrimental reliance.  Congress has promul-
gated clear directives prohibiting misleading summary descriptions.  This court
elects not to undermine the legislative command by imposing technical require-
ments upon the employee.”114  Although this language is dicta because the
plaintiff in Edwards had in fact relied to his detriment on the inaccurate
SPD,115 two other circuits have accepted this “no reliance” standard.116  In
108 Id.
109 Id. at 113-14 (quoting Manginaro v. Welfare Fund of Local 771, 21 F. Supp. 2d 284,
297 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
110 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
111 Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988).
112 Id. at 135, 137.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 137.
115 Id.
116 See infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
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addition, other courts accepting a reliance-based standard have had to refute the
reasoning behind it.117
Although Edwards was first in time, the Third Circuit was the first court
to actually include the “no reliance” standard as part of its holding in Burstein
v. Retirement Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Education and
Research Foundation.118  In Burstein, the plaintiffs tried to recover benefits
through a retirement plan that had terminated.119  According to the SPD, upon
termination of the plan, individuals automatically became vested regardless of
years of service.120  However, the actual plan qualified the SPD by providing
that beneficiaries would only receive those benefits that accrued as of the termi-
nation date.121  The court first held that the terms of the SPD controlled.122
The court then found that the plaintiffs did not need to prove reliance on the
SPD, holding that “[c]laims for ERISA plan benefits . . . are contractual in
nature . . . [and] the SPD serves as a summary of the contract’s (i.e., the plan
document’s) key terms.”123  Furthermore, the court decided, as in contract law,
the plan itself should be interpreted to include the terms of the summary, and to
the extent the plan was modified by the SPD, the SPD should control.124
Finally, the court stated:
[J]ust as a court’s enforcement of a contract generally does not require proof that the
parties to the contract actually read, and therefore relied upon, the particular terms of
the contract, we are persuaded that enforcement of an SPD’s terms under a claim for
plan benefits does not require a showing of reliance.125
Finally, in the most recent SPD case, Washington v. Murphy Oil USA,
Inc.,126 an employee was injured on the job after nearly nine years of employ-
ment.127  As a result of the injury, the employee was unable to return to his
job.128  The plan documents required an employee to complete ten years of
employment to be eligible to receive benefits.129  Therefore under the plan
itself, the employee was ineligible for benefits.130  However, the SPD required
only five years of service for the employee’s interest to vest.131  The Fifth Cir-
cuit first decided that the provisions of the SPD governed.132  The court then
addressed the issue of whether the employee should be required to show reli-
117 See, e.g., Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992).
118 Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).
119 Id. at 371.
120 Id. at 375.
121 Id. at 375-76.
122 Id. at 378.
123 Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 381.
125 Id.
126 Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2007).
127 Id. at 455.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 457 (“Because the terms of the SPD and the Plan conflict, the terms of the SPD
control and are binding on Murphy.”).
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ance on the SPD in order to recover.133  This question was critical to the out-
come in Murphy Oil, because the plaintiff’s break in employment was due to an
on-the-job injury and not a personal choice.134  Therefore, plaintiff could not
have relied on the SPD, and his claim would fail if the court required a showing
of reliance.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that reliance was not required.135  The court rea-
soned that:
[T]his approach is most consistent with ERISA, which is designed to protect employ-
ees; and most consistent with our opinion in Hansen,136 which refused to place the
burden of conflicting SPDs on plan beneficiaries. . . . [A]s a matter of contract law
[the plaintiff’s] right to disability benefits vested and it cannot be taken away.137
The “no reliance” standard is the next logical step after a court has deter-
mined that the terms of the SPD govern over the conflicting terms of the plan
documents.  Determining that the terms of the SPD control over the terms of
the plan documents follows from the intent behind ERISA to protect employ-
ees.138  Allowing the SPD to govern also stems from the idea that ERISA plans
are contracts between the employer and the employee with the SPD serving as
a summary of the contract terms.139  For these reasons, all courts deciding SPD
cases should adopt the “no reliance” standard.
As the Third Circuit explained in Burstein, in contract law the courts are
not concerned with whether the parties read the contract.140  Courts are espe-
cially unconcerned when the party looking to enforce the contract was not in a
position to negotiate the terms of the contract.141  Cases involving SPDs are not
like cases involving a contract of adhesion where a sophisticated party attempts
to enforce non-negotiated terms against a less sophisticated party.  Instead,
these SPD cases usually involve an unsophisticated party who desires to hold a
sophisticated party to the terms of a contract the sophisticated party itself
drafted.  This standard is the most appropriate standard when considering the
circumstances of these cases and the intent behind ERISA.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE “NO RELIANCE” STANDARD
Since the First Circuit decided Govoni in 1984, the circuits have slowly
moved away from the “reliance or prejudice” standard.142  One reason some
circuits have declined to follow Govoni is that the “reliance or prejudice” stan-
133 Id. at 457-58.
134 Id. at 455.
135 Id. at 458-59 (“Accordingly, we hold that when the terms of an SPD and an ERISA plan
conflict and the terms of the conflicting SPD unequivocally grant the employee with a vested
right to benefits, the employee need not show reliance or prejudice.”).
136 Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1991).
137 Murphy Oil, 497 F.3d at 459.
138 Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 378-79 (3d Cir. 2003).
139 Murphy Oil, 497 F.3d at 458-59.
140 Burstein, 334 F.3d at 381.
141 See Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).
142 See supra Part III.
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dard does not reflect Congress’ intent in enacting ERISA.143  Additionally, an
estoppel-like requirement of reliance is contrary to the contractual nature
bestowed on ERISA plans144 when a court decides that the terms of an SPD
govern over the terms of conflicting plan documents.145  In contrast, a “no reli-
ance” standard holds employers responsible for the documents they create and
will promote more careful drafting of these documents.146  Contrary to some
assertions, a “no reliance” standard will not create a multitude of unfair wind-
falls, will not necessarily increase litigation, and is not contrary to the intent
behind ERISA legislation.
A. There are Many Reasons to Adopt a “No Reliance” Standard
1. A “No Reliance” Standard is Consistent with Congress’ Expressed
Intent in Enacting ERISA
Nearly all circuits agree that the main purpose behind ERISA is to protect
employees.147  Even the Eleventh Circuit in Branch, while arguably adopting
the strictest standard of all the circuits, acknowledged that Congress wanted
“‘to protect the beneficiaries of benefit plans by insuring that employees are
fully and accurately apprised of their rights under the plan.’”148  A similar goal
of Congress in enacting ERISA was “to protect . . . the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans . . . by requiring the disclosure and reporting to par-
ticipants . . . of financial and other information . . . by establishing standards of
conduct . . . and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.”149
Plan participant protection is an important theme in ERISA legislation,
and the “no reliance” standard best matches this intent by refusing to place the
burden of proof on employees.  The court in Branch complains that employees
who do not read the SPD are not “do[ing] their part” to further Congress’ intent
that they stay well-informed.150  However, no language in the ERISA statute
implies that Congress was concerned with employees who failed to study their
respective SPDs.  The only intent language in the ERISA statute describes Con-
gress’ concern with employers’ efforts to inform employees through the SPD
and holding employers responsible for their failure to do so.151  If the employer
never produces an accurate SPD, the employee who has read the inaccurate
SPD is just as informed about the actual plan’s provisions as the employee who
never read the SPD.
Furthermore, Congress intended to provide for appropriate remedies and
sanctions,152 both of which a “no reliance” standard promotes.  A “no reliance”
143 See supra Part III.
144 Burstein, 334 F.3d at 381.
145 Valenza, supra note 18, at 367.
146 Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991).
147 This is reflected in the fact that nearly every circuit has decided that SPDs control in the
event of conflict with plans. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
148 Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
149 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
150 Branch, 955 F.2d at 1579.
151 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
152 Id.
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standard allows remedies for an employee who has been injured under the
terms of a poorly-drafted SPD even though the employee may be unable to
prove actual reliance on a specific term.153  A “no reliance” standard also fur-
thers Congress’ intent to provide for sanctions.  While the quoted statute refers
to statutory sanctions, the statutory language demonstrates an intent to punish
irresponsible employers to the benefit of employees (whether or not he relied
on the SPD).  Between an irresponsible employer and a lazy employee, ERISA
sides with the employee, and court decisions should reflect that intent, even if
doing so has the effect of “sanctioning” the employer.
2. The General Rule that an SPD Governs Between Conflicting Plan
Documents is Inconsistent with Also Requiring a Showing of
Reliance
Next, as evidenced by the Eighth Circuit opinions, there is a conflict
between the contract-like analysis the reliance and prejudice circuits begin
using in SPD cases and the estoppel-like analysis with which they end.154  The
circuits begin by using a contract-like theory to find that an SPD controls over
the conflicting terms found in plan documents, similar to a summary section of
a contract.155  However, the courts then engage in an estoppel-like analysis to
find that the SPD only allows recovery if reliance is shown.156  This begs the
question:  why determine that an SPD governs in the first place if the court is
going to require proof of reliance later?  To be consistent, courts should use one
of the following two approaches:
1) the SPD is not contractual in nature, does not in itself confer any rights
on the beneficiary, and therefore does not govern unless the elements
of estoppel can be proven (similar to the Eighth Circuit’s standard
when an SPD is “faulty”); or
2) the SPD is contractual in nature, and therefore does create enforceable
rights.
The Supreme Court should reject any approach that states an SPD governs
over plan documents but then retracts that protection if the plaintiff cannot
show reliance; such a position is internally inconsistent.
3. Employers Should be Held Responsible for the Documents They
Create
Another reason a “no reliance” standard is appropriate is that the employer
is responsible for creating plan documents and the SPD; therefore, the
employer should be responsible for errors in those documents.  ERISA imposes
153 It should be noted that proving reliance is not always easy because of the subjective
nature of reliance.  Therefore, just because an employee would be unable to prove reliance
does not necessarily mean he did not rely.  The idea behind the “presumption of prejudice”
and the “no reliance” standards is that, because of the intent behind ERISA, the employee
should not have this burden.
154 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
155 See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 378 n.18 (3d Cir. 2003).
156 Palmisano v. Allina Health Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 1999).
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an affirmative obligation to create documents complying with the statute.157  A
“no reliance” standard simply places the burden where it belongs:  with the
employer creating the document.158  All an employer needs to do to avoid liti-
gation and liability in conflicting SPD cases is create an SPD consistent with
the terms of the plan documents.159
“Reliance” standards unfairly shift the burden from the employers to
employees, who enjoy no influence in the drafting of the plan documents or
SPDs.160  In contract law, courts construe ambiguities against the drafter161 and
parties can be bound by contracts they have not read.162  Courts should simi-
larly hold employers who draft inaccurate SPDs responsible for their sloppy
drafting regardless of whether the employees read or were unfairly burdened by
the defective SPD.163  While binding employers to documents they create may
arguably create a windfall for some employees, the intent behind ERISA is to
both inform and provide remedies for employees.164  There is no expressed
intent in the ERISA statute to protect employers from their own mistakes.
4. The “No Reliance” Standard Will Create an Incentive for
Employers to Carefully Draft Accurate Plan Documents and SPDs
Related to the concept that employers should be responsible for the docu-
ments they create is that the strict liability nature of a “no reliance” standard
will create an incentive for careful drafting that is absent in the other standards.
There is no doubt that a “no reliance” standard is the easiest burden of proof for
a plaintiff to meet.  Consequently, an employer that creates a conflicting SPD
will be open to more liability than under the other standards.  The employer’s
cost/benefit analysis will change when drafting SPDs and plan documents
because of this possibility of increased liability.
Employers who previously viewed the likelihood of litigation arising from
an SPD as small, and therefore invested little in drafting the SPD, may now see
more benefit from a larger investment.  This extra investment pays benefits
both to the employer and the employee.  The employer will have more confi-
dence that the chances of SPD-related litigation will decrease.  In addition, the
improved SPDs and plan documents will greatly benefit employees who can be
confident that their SPD accurately reflects the plan documents.  Finally, the
more accurate documents will better embrace the intent behind ERISA of creat-
ing informed employees.
157 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
158 Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991).
159 This is obviously easier said than done considering the complexity of many of these
plans.  Nevertheless, employers are the only party with control over the creation of these
documents and should be held responsible as such.
160 Hansen, 940 F.2d at 982.
161 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (“[Supreme Court was] guided by
the general principles that have evolved concerning the interpretation of contractual provi-
sions . . . . Among these principles is the general maxim that a contract should be construed
most strongly against the drafter.”).
162 See, e.g., Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. &
Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 381 (3d Cir. 2003).
163 Id.
164 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
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B. Arguments Against a “No Reliance” Standard are Flawed
1. A “No Reliance” Standard Does Not Create an Automatic Windfall
for Employees Covered under a Plan with a Conflicting SPD
The most popular argument against the “no reliance” standard is supplied
by the Tenth Circuit in Chiles v. Ceridian Corp.165  There, the court argued that
if the plaintiff is not required to show reliance, employees might receive an
unfair windfall to the detriment of the plan and other employees depending on
the plan’s funding.166  The Tenth Circuit stated that adoption of a “no reliance”
standard “would allow a windfall for some employees and unfairly increase
costs for employers and their insurers, who rely on the terms of the plan in
providing benefits and coverage.  This in turn could jeopardize the solvency of
the plan with respect to the remaining employees.”167
The first counterargument to this view is that courts should not concern
themselves with any added expense to employers, because the employer could
have avoided the problem by being more careful in drafting the SPD.168  There
is, however, a legitimate concern that windfalls to numerous employees will
negatively affect the interests of other plan beneficiaries.169  It is therefore
important to look closely at the possibility that windfalls will occur.  First,
despite the Tenth Circuit’s ominous language, the “no reliance” standard does
not allow for automatic awards given to every employee subject to a defective
SPD.170  Although the “no liability” standard looks like a strict liability rule, a
plaintiff must still show an injury and the extent of the injury to recover dam-
ages.  Plaintiffs will only receive damages in the amount of that injury.  Despite
these concerns regarding windfalls, minor conflicts between SPDs and plan
documents simply will not give rise to multi-million dollar judgments for every
employee subject to the conflicting SPD.  Additionally, the fact that the plain-
tiff was not aware of the cause of the injury or the injury itself when it occurred
does not mean there is no injury and that any subsequent recovery is a windfall.
If this were the rule, no cause of action involving an initially ignorant plaintiff,
such as fraud, would ever survive.
Secondly, in all of the conflicting SPD cases, at some point the employee
consulted and relied on the SPD, even when the court says he or she has not.
For example, assume an employee was discharged after seventeen years of ser-
vice.  Before his discharge, he never consulted the plan’s SPD.  According to
plan documents, twenty years of service were required to receive retirement
benefits and the employer declines to pay the benefits.  The employee, feeling
he deserves retirement benefits, consults the only document he has immediate
access to:  the SPD.  The SPD states that employees are entitled to retirement
benefits after fifteen years of service.  The employee brings this to the
165 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996).
166 Id. at 1519.
167 Id.
168 Valenza, supra note 18, at 393.
169 Michael Cavadel, Burke v. Kodak and the SPD Circuit Split, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
139, 153 (2004).
170 Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 459 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that
“[o]ur holding today is limited to situations in which the conflicting terms of an SPD
unequivocally grant the employee with a vested right to benefits.”).
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employer’s attention, and the employer denies the employee’s claim, stating
that the plan documents govern.  The employee promptly consults an attorney,
and files suit.
Jurisdictions applying the “reliance” standard are not likely to find for the
plaintiff because the plaintiff could not have relied on the SPD, having never
consulted the SPD prior to his discharge.  However, as in all of the conflicting
SPD cases that come before the courts, at least two instances of reliance occur
with our hypothetical employee.  First, the employee would have to know
enough about the plan, from coworkers and supervisors, to know he should
consult the SPD in the first place.  The coworkers’ and supervisors’ knowledge
presumably came from the SPD.  This reasoning is what the Second Circuit
alluded to with its “presumption of prejudice” standard.171  Second, the deci-
sion to consult an attorney and bring a lawsuit derives from the reasonable
reliance that the plaintiff has an enforceable right under the SPD.  Because an
SDP must have been relied on in at least these instances in order for a suit to
get to litigation in the first place, the court should be less concerned with an
employee’s windfall than an employer’s poor drafting.
Finally, the courts have created this “problem” of windfall by establishing
the rule that the terms of the SPD should govern over the conflicting terms of
the plan documents.  By stating that the SPD governs, the courts have essen-
tially created enforceable contract rights in the SPD and the plaintiff is receiv-
ing a windfall because he is recovering on enforceable rights the court created
in an SPD.  Courts truly concerned with windfalls should analyze SPDs on a
case-by-case basis to decide whether allowing the SPD to govern would create
a windfall for that particular plaintiff.
2. Applying the “No Reliance” Standard Will Not Increase Litigation
Another argument against the “no reliance” standard is that allowing
plaintiffs to make a claim without proving reliance would open the doors to
increased litigation.172  Under the “no reliance” standard, employees who did
not rely on the conflicting terms of an SPD are able to bring a successful claim
against an employer.  If this happens, employers, plans, and plan beneficiaries
may feel the effects of the plan’s increased litigation costs since those costs are
presumably being taken from the plan and therefore being paid by other plan
participants.173  Similar to the argument that a “no reliance” standard will cre-
ate windfalls for “undeserving” employees at the expense of other plan benefi-
ciaries, opponents of the “no reliance” standard argue that increased litigation
and litigation costs will likewise negatively affect other plan beneficiaries.174
While resulting increased litigation costs are an important concern, this argu-
ment is unfounded because the “no reliance” standard will not necessarily
increase litigation.
171 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2003).
172 Cavadel, supra note 169, at 153.
173 Id. (“[T]he Burstein standard could cause more harm than good by forcing employee
plan participants to pay for the costs of the increased liability that plan administrators may
face.”).
174 Id.
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If the Supreme Court were to adopt the “no reliance” standard, two factors
would decrease SPD litigation costs.  First, there would be a consistent, intelli-
gible rule in place.  Employers with employees in multiple jurisdictions will
have certainty as to which standard applies and research costs would decrease.
However, this result would occur regardless of which standard the Supreme
Court adopts for uniformity in addressing this issue.  More importantly, and as
discussed above, a standard that places the burden on employers would give
employers an incentive to be more careful in drafting SPDs and plan docu-
ments.  While the short-term legal costs may rise as more time is spent creating
the documents, long-term litigation costs would fall as fewer and fewer con-
flicts arise between plan documents and SPDs.
Even if more suits are brought because of the easier burden on the plain-
tiff, the “no reliance” standard eliminates the extremely subjective issues of
reliance and probability of prejudice.  “One might assume that if neither reli-
ance nor prejudice were required, more claims could be decided pretrial, thus
saving the parties from an expensive and time-consuming trial.”175  Besides
potentially simplifying SPD litigation, eliminating the subjective issue of reli-
ance also eliminates the concern that courts can substitute their judgment as to
whether an employee relied on the SPD.176
The practical difference between the “no reliance” standard and the Sec-
ond Circuit’s “rebuttable presumption of prejudice” standard might be best
illustrated by litigation costs.  The Second Circuit’s standard not only requires
proof of likelihood of harm, it then allows the employer to rebut that evidence,
increasing litigation costs even more.177  Although on its surface, placing the
burden of proof on the employer is consistent with the intent of ERISA, this
standard severely increases discovery and litigation costs to the detriment of
other plan beneficiaries.178  Not only does the Second Circuit’s standard main-
tain the subjective standards of reliance and prejudice, it requires the employer,
who is in the worst position to prove reliance or prejudice, to prove a negative,
i.e. there was no reliance.
3. The “No Reliance” Standard’s Contractual Basis is Not Contrary
to Congress’ Intent in Enacting ERISA
The final argument against a “no reliance” standard is that it rests on con-
tract law, the application of which is unsupported by statute.179  Although the
ERISA statute provides no explicit support for a contract-type analysis, legisla-
tive intent supports protecting employees.180  The contract theory is consistent
with Congress’ intent by placing responsibility on employers.  Further, as this
Note has shown, the case law illustrates that the circuits have interpreted
175 Valenza, supra note 18, at 392.
176 Id. at 393.
177 Id. at 392.
178 Id.
179 Joyce, supra note 4, at 786-87.
180 Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2003).
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ERISA with reference to at least some contractual concepts when deciding
whether the SPD or plan documents should govern a dispute.181
A problem that arises with a contractual interpretation is that if we allow
contract law to guide these SPD decisions, the entire SPD should control—not
just the conflicting terms.182  This interpretation is relevant because many
SPDs contain a disclaimer providing that the plan documents govern in the
event of conflict, and not the SPD.183  The Eleventh Circuit has held that
upholding these disclaimers would be unfair.184  The Third Circuit, in Burstein,
looked at the facts surrounding the SPD and the disclaimer contained
therein,185 and decided that the SPD controlled, in part because plan documents
were not readily accessible.186  The Third Circuit approaches a suitable middle
ground.  Instead of flatly stating that in every situation the SPD will control, the
rule should be that the court can make a limited inquiry into whether, under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to give effect to a disclaimer.  However, where
the SPD is effectively the only document available to an employee, and giving
effect to the plan documents would be unreasonable, the SPD should govern
and the employee should not have to show reliance on it to recover.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the wide disagreement among the circuits on the issue of the cor-
rect standard of reliance required for recovery on an inaccurate SPD, and the
wide range of relief afforded to employees depending on the jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court should address the issue of conflicting SPDs and plan docu-
ments.  In order to remain true to legislative intent and obtain a result that is
fair to both employees and employers, the Supreme Court should adopt the “no
reliance” rule from Burstein, Edwards, and Murphy Oil.187
181 See Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 497 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2007); Bur-
stein, 334 F.3d at 381-82.
182 Joyce, supra note 4, at 787.
183 See, e.g., Burstein, 334 F.3d at 379 (noting the front page of SPD provided that the
“[P]lan [D]ocument always governs”).
184 McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985).
185 Burstein, 334 F.3d at 379.
186 Id. (“The relative inaccessibility of [employer’s] Plan Document serves to highlight that,
as Congress intended, the SPD is the primary document on which plan participants must
rely.”).
187 As with any rule, circumstances may require some exceptions to the rule.  While these
exceptions are not the focus of this Note, this Note has suggested some, such as in the case
of a reasonable disclaimer or a statutorily deficient SPD.
